Kunne man oprette et LAN netværk med to computere, hvor du så giver hijacker en adresse som du ved ikke er brugt på netværket. Derefter opretter du forbindelse til den anden computer med en SYN. Computeren vil så prøve at sende en SYN ACK tilbage til den computer (som ikke er der). Resten kender du jo selv.
Faktisk bør angriberen spoofe en nonroutable adresse, da det ellers vil være default gateway, som modtager SYN ACK pakken, og hvis den er konfigureret korrekt (default), vil den sende en RST pakke tilbage.
Men sæt en maskine op med en Apache web server og angrib løs på den...prøv evt. med en virtuel maskine.
Operativsystemerne kan forsvare sig mod SYN angreb i dag, men dette forsvar kan man slå fra. I Linux gør du følgende:
$ sudo echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
...så burde du kunne angribe løs.
Her er lige et citat fra
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1711
enable /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
A very popular denial of service attack involves a cracker sending many (possibly forged) SYN packets to your server, but never completing the TCP three way handshake. This quickly uses up slots in the kernel's half open queue, preventing legitimate connections from succeeding. Since a connection does not need to be completed, there need be no resources used on the attacking machine, so this is easy to perform and maintain.
If the tcp_syncookies variable is set (only available if your kernel was compiled with CONFIG_SYNCOOKIES) then the kernel handles TCP SYN packets normally until the queue is full, at which point the SYN cookie functionality kicks in.
SYN cookies work by not using a SYN queue at all. Instead the kernel will reply to any SYN packet with a SYN|ACK as normal, but it will present a specially-crafted TCP sequence number that encodes the source and destination IP address and port number and the time the packet was sent. An attacker performing the SYN flood would never have gotten this packet at all if they're spoofing, so they wouldn't respond. A legitimate connection attempt would send the third packet of the three way handshake which includes this sequence number, and the server can verify that it must be in response to a valid SYN cookie and allows the connection, even though there is no corresponding entry in the SYN queue.
Enabling SYN cookies is a very simple way to defeat SYN flood attacks while using only a bit more CPU time for the cookie creation and verification. Since the alternative is to reject all incoming connections, enabling SYN cookies is an obvious choice. For more information about the inner workings of SYN cookies, see http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html